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Hybrid Obfuscation to Protect against Disclosure
Attacks on Embedded Microprocessors
Marc Fyrbiak, Simon Rokicki, Nicolai Bissantz, Russell Tessier, Christof Paar, Fellow, IEEE
Abstract—The risk of code reverse-engineering is particularly acute for embedded processors which often have limited available
resources to protect program information. Previous efforts involving code obfuscation provide some additional security against reverse-
engineering of programs, but the security benefits are typically limited and not quantifiable. Hence, new approaches to code protection
and creation of associated metrics are highly desirable. This paper has two main contributions. We propose the first hybrid diversification
approach for protecting embedded software and we provide statistical metrics to evaluate the protection. Diversification is achieved by
combining hardware obfuscation at the microarchitecture level and the use of software-level obfuscation techniques tailored to embedded
systems. Both measures are based on a compiler which generates obfuscated programs, and an embedded processor implemented in
an FPGA with a randomized ISA encoding to execute the hybrid obfuscated program. We employ a fine-grained, hardware-enforced
access control mechanism for information exchange with the processor and hardware-assisted booby traps to actively counteract
manipulation attacks. It is shown that our approach is effective against a wide variety of possible information disclosure attacks in case of
a physically present adversary. Moreover, we propose a novel statistical evaluation methodology that provides a security metric for
hybrid-obfuscated programs.
Index Terms—Computer architecture, ISA randomization, software obfuscation, reverse-engineering.
F
1 INTRODUCTION
EMBEDDED microprocessors are vital resources in a widearray of low-end computing platforms. With the continu-
ing growth of the Internet of Things (IoT), simple processors
are widely found in vehicles, appliances, health sensors,
and infrastructure monitors, among other systems [1]. Often,
these processors must operate in severely constrained envi-
ronments with stringent power and performance demands.
However, in many cases, predictable software security and
reliability must be maintained.
Most previous efforts at providing software protection at
the hardware level have included secure processors [2], [3],
[4]. Although provably secure, these implementations focus
more on preventing illegal execution of code and data secu-
rity than on obscuring software control flow and algorithm
implementation. For many real-world embedded systems,
the storage of program code in external, untrusted memories
and the knowledge of the Instruction Set Architecture (ISA)
provide an unfortunate attack vector [5] regarding reverse-
engineering and intellectual property protection. Hence, as
soon as the ISA can be concealed from an adversary, the
effort level needed to disclose critical information from the
program code, such as an algorithm implementation, rises.
Increasingly, microprocessors and other circuitry are
implemented in devices which include field-programmable
logic [6] providing an attractive opportunity to customize a
processor’s control logic. Instruction decoding implemented
in field-programmable logic offers a flexible solution to
randomize instruction encoding among numerous embedded
systems. Furthermore, such hardware-level alteration is
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agnostic to other processor architecture features.
In this paper, we focus on a hybrid approach to security
via hardware-level obfuscation on the microarchitecture
level and the use of software-level obfuscation techniques
suited for embedded systems. Our approach tackles the
shortcomings of existing state-of-the art ISA randomization
defenses for an adversary with physical access to the target
device. Particularly, we address various generic disclosure
attacks for embedded systems that can be exploited to extract
critical instruction encoding information. We categorize these
information disclosure sources as ranging from general
hardware access capabilities to program specific characteris-
tics to the employed instruction encoding format. We then
introduce our hybrid obfuscation design which defeats the
different attacks and thus prevents reverse-engineering and
software execution on an illegitimate platform. Our main
contributions are:
● Hardware-level Obfuscation. We introduce an ISA
randomization scheme which prevents information
disclosure of a broad range of attacks. The scheme
alters the microprocessor decode unit using hardware-
efficient transformations. Furthermore, we restrict
memory accesses using a fine-grained, hardware-level
policy and actively counteract manipulation attacks
using hardware-level booby traps.
● Software-level Obfuscation. In concert with the aug-
mented hardware, we employ software-level obfusca-
tion techniques including Control Flow Graph (CFG)-
level and instruction-level obfuscation to remove
diverse program characteristics and thus overcome
the general limitations of our cost-efficient ISA ran-
domization.
● Coverage of Dynamic Adversaries. We provide a
detailed analysis of various information disclosure
sources for a physical adversary with dynamic access
to the instruction bus. We also discuss the generic
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shortcomings of state-of-the-art ISA randomization
defenses in our adversary model.
● Novel Evaluation Methodology. We present a novel
metric for our hybrid obfuscation approach to express
the effects of different obfuscation transformations. In
particular, we incorporate statistical analysis of the
instruction-level distributions and similarity analysis
of the dynamic CFGs.
2 BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
Our work builds on previous research in secure and attack-
resistant processor design. The relationship between these
works and our approach is detailed below:
Secure Processors. Over the past fifteen years, a number
of secure processors have been developed. XOM [2] protects
against piracy and manipulation of application software
by only allowing an application to execute code from
specific memory locations. AEGIS [3] uses instruction set
extensions to protect execution and access to segments of
memory. The OASIS processor [4] also uses ciphered data
with cryptographic keys provided by Physical Unclonable
Functions (PUFs). Other processors [7] do not include crypto-
graphic cores but instead use PUFs to obfuscate portions of
processor function, e.g., instruction opcodes. In order to mask
the memory accesses, Oblivious Random Access Memory
(ORAM) can be utilized [8]. While these approaches provide
provable security, the presence and use of cryptographic
cores adds significant area and performance overheads
and thus non-negligible costs [9] for the overall system.
Our processor architectural changes are considerably more
modest compared to cryptographic approaches and do not
impact processor performance.
Side Channel Attacks. As a consequence of physical
adversarial access to embedded devices, Side-Channel Anal-
ysis (SCA) using power consumption or electromagnetic
emanation can be exploited. For example, SCA attacks on
market-dominating Xilinx and Altera Static Random Access
Memory (SRAM)-Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs)
families [10], [11] have been shown. SCA is not only
limited to cryptographic implementations. It can be also
leveraged to extract the code of embedded processors based
on the electromagnetic emanation [12], [13]. However, the
attack technique has various limitations such as imperfect
recognition rates and a restriction to opcode and not operand
detection.
Reverse-Engineering and Obfuscation. A variety of
software obfuscation and deobfuscation approaches have
been developed over decades. Software security to hamper
reverse-engineering has yielded various transformations to
restrict static and dynamic analysis [14], [15], [16]. These
transformations include code flattening, data encoding,
on-demand code decryption, and virtual-machine based
techniques [17]. To automatically reverse-engineer programs
equipped with obfuscation transformations, automatic deob-
fuscation techniques have been developed [18], [19]. Note
that these approaches generally require knowledge of the
ISA to emulate or statically analyze the targeted program.
Statistical analyses of the targeted program are employed
for malware detection and classification. For example, fre-
quency analysis, entropy, and hidden Markov models of
instructions are able to classify malware among several
families [20], [21], [22]. Also, several algorithms have been
proposed to measure the similarity between CFGs with
the goal of malware detection [23]. In particular, different
approaches were developed based on subgraphs [24] and
graph edit distance [25]. Software exploitation [26] and
software diversity [27] are related topics, but focus on
different adversary models. In our evaluation, we merge
the concepts of statistical analysis and CFG similarity to
demonstrate the influence of obfuscation techniques and to
define a security metric.
ISA Randomization. As software obfuscation suffers
from the fundamental limitation of a known ISA, various
approaches were developed to randomize the ISA with the
goal of code injection mitigation [28], [29], [30], [31], [32], [33],
[34]. These transformations modify the original instruction
encoding and employ additional hardware circuitry to
retrieve the original instruction prior to the decode phase.
Contrary to our work, these related works focus on a different
adversary model without physical access capabilities.
3 SYSTEM AND ADVERSARY MODEL
In the following, we specify the assumptions for our hybrid
obfuscation defense and identify the generic disclosure
attacks in this setup.
3.1 System Model
We assume a simple and low-cost Reduced Instruction Set
Computer (RISC)-based processor architecture. In particular,
we assume the use of secure internal Random Access Mem-
ory (RAM) for stored data and insecure in-system (external)
Read-Only Memory (ROM) for program memory. Due to
the processor’s simplicity, we preclude the use of caches. We
further assume Memory Mapped Input/Output (MMIO) to
perform communication with external peripheral devices.
Overall, we assume that the underlying Central Process-
ing Unit (CPU) hardware is trustworthy. In contrast, the
external ROM and all external bus interfaces are untrustwor-
thy. Hardware debugging features (e.g., JTAG) that reveal
values of internal registers or RAM are excluded from the
device or are disabled.
3.2 Adversary Model
We suppose that the adversary has physical access to the
target device. His main goal is the reverse-engineering of
high-level information from the program such as protocols,
cryptographic keys, or the algorithm(s) itself. Based on the
physical access, the adversary can read and write arbitrary
values in the untrusted program memory. Furthermore, the
adversary is capable of dynamic read/write access to the
external bus interfaces via probing and tampering with low-
speed and high-speed buses. Passive side-channel analysis
can be leveraged by the adversary, however, invasive attacks
such as transistor level modification are outside the scope of
this work.
3.3 Adversarial Disclosure Attacks
Instruction execution results in a variety of actions such as
register and memory read/writes and status flag register up-
dates. Hence, the attacker can obtain execution information
even without knowledge of the instruction encoding.
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Control Flow Attack. The adversary obtains the address
of the next fetched instruction and thus the instruction
pointer by passive access to external interfaces. Hence, all
control flow instructions and thus the Dynamic Control
Flow Graph (DCFG) are immediately revealed and the type
(unconditional, conditional, call/return) of each executed
control flow instruction is disclosed. Even in the case
of an obfuscated instruction encoding, the adversary can
exploit control flow instructions to reveal the encoding by
manipulation of the instruction operand and observation of
the next fetched instruction. Similarly, branch instructions
can be exploited to check whether two register values meet
a condition (depending on the specific branch opcode) at
runtime through modification of the source data in the
instruction operand.
Input/Output Attack. The adversary can observe
communication from the CPU to peripheral devices
through passive access to the external interfaces. Even if
the instruction encoding is obfuscated, the adversary can
exploit Input/Output (I/O) instructions to disclose internal,
dynamic values by manipulation of the source data encoding
in the instruction operand.
The following three attacks may not directly reveal the
instruction encoding as they depend on the underlying CPU
and instruction set, but they can aid the adversary’s reverse
engineering.
System Configuration Attack. In general, the adversary
can deduce valuable system information by means of system
configuration. Any displayed errors can be used to deduce
sensitive information [35]. Even if the instruction encoding
is obfuscated, a manipulated system configuration instruc-
tion supports the adversary’s reverse-engineering efforts
to understand the system, e.g., sleep activation, interrupt
deactivation, or timer unit configuration. For example, if
a manipulated instruction leads to the CPU entering sleep
mode, the adversary can deduce which bits in the obfuscated
encoding belong to the opcode field. Similarly, any displayed
error discloses valuable information regarding the instruction
encoding to the adversary. For example, if a manipulated
instruction leads to an invalid opcode error the adversary can
deduce which bits belong to the opcode field.
Instruction Timing Attack. Different instruction groups
can include instructions which consume a varying number of
clock cycles. For example, arithmetic instructions may require
more cycles than logical instructions. Based on precise mea-
surements of the consumed clock cycles per instruction, the
adversary can disclose the targeted instruction’s group [35].
For example, if a manipulated instruction leads to a different
execution time after modification, the adversary can deduce
which bits in the obfuscated encoding belong to the opcode.
Correctness Attack. The deterministic behaviour of a
targeted part of a program may be determined by examining
the program’s output. Even if the instruction encoding is
obfuscated, the adversary can gain information. In particular,
if a deterministic part of program is altered in such a way
that its semantic is preserved, the program output remains
the same, see Sect. 9 for a detailed attack description.
The related works in Tab. 1 do not assume a physical
and dynamic adversary. Thus, all publicly known ISA
randomization schemes can be circumvented by use of the
Approach ISA Randomization Technique CF Attack I/O Attack
[28] XOR
√ √
[29] XOR / Instr. Permutation
√ √
[30] XOR
√ √
[36] XOR / Instr. Permutation
√ √
[34] Instr. Perm. and Operand Subst.
√ √
Ours see Sect. 5 – –
Table 1: Overview of ISA randomization schemes and their
susceptibility to control flow and I/O attacks.
attacks. For example, the key k of XOR-based schemes
can be obtained via the control flow attack as follows: an
unconditional control flow instruction i ⊕ k is executed
and the adversary obtains the next fetched instruction and
hence obtains the operand of the instruction i. For permuted
instructions, the adversary simply toggles each bit per trial to
obtain the manipulated next instruction address and thereby
reveals the permutation.
4 INSTRUCTION SET ARCHITECTURE
4.1 Assembly Language
The assembly language format of a microprocessor is a
crucial component for an obfuscation scheme. Lst. 1 defines
a generic assembly language in Backus-Naur Form (BNF).
This language can be mapped to virtually any assembly
language.
⟨Program⟩ ::= ⟨Program⟩ ⟨Inst⟩
⟨Inst⟩ ::= ⟨M⟩
| ⟨CF⟩ ⟨imm⟩
| ⟨DT⟩ ⟨reg⟩ ⟨reg⟩ ⟨imm⟩
| ⟨DTC⟩ ⟨imm⟩
| ⟨AL⟩ ⟨reg⟩ ⟨reg⟩ ⟨val⟩
⟨M⟩ := ’nop’ | ’sleep’
⟨CF⟩ ::= ’call’ | ’ret’ | ’jmp’ | ’beq’ | ’bne’
⟨DT⟩ ::= ’ld’ | ’st’
⟨DTC⟩ ::= ’ldc’ | ’stc’
⟨AL⟩ ::= ’and’ | ’or’ | ’not’ | ’xor’ | ’sll’ | ’srl’ | ’slt’
| ’add’ | ’sub’ | ’mul’ | ’div’
⟨val⟩ ::= ⟨imm⟩ | ⟨reg⟩
Listing 1: Generic RISC-based assembly language in BNF
clustered into instruction groups.
In general, the instructions of the assembly language can be
grouped into four distinct groups:
● Control Flow ⟨CF⟩: Instructions which cause an
unconditional control flow change (jmp), branch
instructions (beq, bne), and function calls (call,
ret).
● Data Transfer ⟨DT⟩,⟨DTC⟩: Instructions which trans-
fer data via load (ld) and store (st) between the
different memories such as the register file and the
RAM.
● Arithmetic/Logical ⟨AL⟩: Instructions that modify
the data contents by means of logical and arithmetic
functions such as add and xor.
● Miscellaneous ⟨M⟩: All remaining instructions such
as nop and sleep.
Note that the rationale for the missing registers in
the branch instructions and the additional ldc and stc
instructions is stated in Sect. 5.3.
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4.2 Instruction Format
We employ the Microprocessor without Interlocked Pipeline
Stages (MIPS) instruction format due to its wide use in
embedded systems and its simplicity. The latter character-
istic is particularly advantageous for security analysis and
implementation.
Type Instruction Format
R opcode(6) rsrc1(5) rsrc2(5) rdst(5) shamt(5) funct(6)
I opcode(6) rsrc(5) rdst(5) immediate(16)
J opcode(6) address(26)
index
31 0
Figure 1: MIPS instruction format with 32-bit width. The
bit-width of each instruction field is denoted by the number
put in brackets after the field name.
Each MIPS instruction is encoded in a 32-bit vector with
a 6-bit opcode. There are three distinct types of instruction
formats: R-type instructions encode two source registers
rsrc1, rsrc2 and a destination register rdst, each 5-bit wide,
a 5-bit shift amount field shamt, and a 6-bit function
field funct. The funct field further specifies instruction
operation beyond the opcode. I-type instructions employ a
source register rsrc, a destination register rdst, and a 16-bit
immediate value. The operand of J-type instructions only
consists of a 26-bit address field.
5 HARDWARE-LEVEL OBFUSCATION
A fundamental limitation of software-level obfuscation tech-
niques is the adversary’s knowledge of the instruction encod-
ing. Our hardware-level obfuscation targets this encoding
knowledge with simultaneous consideration of the disclosure
attacks.
5.1 Opcode Substitution
The principle idea of our proposed opcode substitution trans-
formation is to employ a randomized encoding of the opcode
field so that the adversary does not know which opcode maps
to which operation. To enhance the effect of the substitution,
we consider homophonic ciphers.
Homophonic Substitution Cipher. A homophonic sub-
stitution cipher maps each plaintext symbol to one or more
ciphertext symbols, called homophones, thereby flattening the
ciphertext symbol distribution and obstructing ciphertext
symbol frequency analysis compared to simple substitution
ciphers. Since their appearance, homophonic substitution ci-
phers have been successfully attacked by exploiting inherent
characteristics of human language [37], [38], [39]. In contrast
to the nature of human language, an instruction sequence can
be arbitrarily altered to hide relevant statistical information1.
Based on the concept of homophones, we informally define
our employed opcode substitution as follows:
1. For example, the instruction add r1,r2,2 can be split up into an
arbitrary combination of multiple add, sub, or shift instructions so that
the semantic is preserved.
The opcode substitution transformation randomly
replaces the native instruction opcode by a pre-
defined relation. Particularly, the relation is right-
total and left-unique with respect to the native ISA
encoding.
To obtain the native opcode during execution, the decode
unit of the CPU implements the inverse mapping of the
right-total, but not right-unique, and left-unique opcode
substitution relation2. This transformation is scalable as the
number of relations from one native opcode to the codomain
elements can be chosen freely. For an implementation, the
upper bound depends on the employed instruction format
and number of supported instructions. In case of the MIPS
instruction format, the 6-bit funct field is also affected by
opcode substitution as it encodes opcode information (jointly
with the 6-bit opcode field).
Example. We assume an ISA with a 2-bit opcode
that only employs the two opcodes 00 and 01. Opcode
substitution maps the original opcodes as follows: opcode
00 is related to 10 and 01, and opcode 01 is related to 11
and 00. Thus, all 2-bit values are employed through opcode
substitution (right-total), and any substituted opcode relates
to only one original opcode (left-unique). Since opcode 00
relates to more than one value, this relation is not right-
unique.
5.2 Operand Permutation
The instruction operand field(s) encode the quantities of
the operation and thus enables data flow analysis. For
example, immediate values can define branch decisions,
memory accesses, or constants. Even without knowledge of
the opcode (which defines the interpretation of the operand),
the operand field can yield meaningful information. There-
fore, we apply an operand permutation transformation to the
instruction operand field as follows:
The operand permutation transformation permutes
the bit-indices of the operand field by a pre-defined
random bit permutation. Program memory is split
into chunks and each chunk of instructions uses its
own randomly chosen permutation.
To reveal the native operand during execution in the CPU, the
inverse permutation is selected based on the instruction ad-
dress, see Fig. 2. This transformation is scalable as the number
of permutations can be chosen freely. For the employed MIPS
format, the whole 26-bit operand is permuted independent
of the instruction type. As a result, the 6-bit funct field for
R-type instructions is spread across the operand.
Unobfuscated Instructions. As a consequence of the
disclosure attacks, we do not obfuscate the whole instruction
set. The following instructions are neither affected by the
opcode substitution nor the operand permutation.
● Control flow instructions: jmp, call, ret, beq, bne.
● System configuration instructions: sleep.
● Data transfer instructions: ldc, stc.
2. Properties of a binary relation R between the sets S and T:
Right-Total: ∀t ∈ T∃s ∈ S∶ (s, t) ∈ R
Right-Unique: ∀s ∈ S∀t, t′ ∈ T∶ (s, t) ∈ R ∧ (s, t′) ∈ R⇒ t = t′
Left-Unique:∀s, s′ ∈ S∀t ∈ T∶ (s, t) ∈ R ∧ (s′, t) ∈ R⇒ s = s′
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Figure 2: CPU datapath augmented with the hardware-level obfuscation features (marked in orange).
5.3 Hardware-enforced Access Control
Hardware-level obfuscation of the instruction encoding does
not prevent instruction tampering via the I/O or control flow
attacks described in Sect. 3.3. The lack of hardware-level
access control on the the data transfer interface between
the CPU and peripheral devices creates the vulnerability. To
protect against I/O and branch instruction manipulation,
we propose a lightweight hardware-based access control
mechanism. Techniques and conditions to detect and respond
to tampering are described in Sect. 5.4.
Hardware-enforced access control restricts the location of
operand registers and memory addresses in I/O and branch
instructions to a certain memory area rather than to general
purpose registers. The unobfuscated data flow (ldc, stc)
and branch instructions (beq, bne) are used in conjunction
with three interface registers rI/O, rb0, rb1 to transfer data
to or from insecure memory areas (e.g., memory addresses
used for I/O). These registers are isolated from the general
purpose registers and cannot be accessed as general purpose
register operands for hardware-level obfuscated instructions.
Access Control Policies. To realize access control, several
hardware-level policies are employed. Internal addressable
memory in the microprocessor, which includes the three
interface registers, is divided into three parts: the general-
purpose GP, the border control BC, and the MMIO areas.
● Hardware-level obfuscated instructions are forced to
operate on locations in the GP and BC areas, but not
the MMIO area.
● Unobfuscated data-flow and branch instructions are
forced to operate in the BC and MMIO area, but not
the GP area.
● The interface register rI/O (accessible via an address
in the BC area) is implicitly employed by ldc and
stc instructions3. The register is accessed by the CPU
using its memory address or implicitly by the ldc
and stc instructions.
3. For example, a ldc 0xabcd instruction loads the value from
address 0xabcd to the register rI/O . A stc 0xabcd instruction stores
the value from the register rI/O to address 0xabcd.
● The interface registers rb0 and rb1 (accessible via
addresses in the BC area) are implicitly utilized by
branch instructions. The registers are accessed by the
CPU using memory addresses or implicitly by branch
instructions.
I/O Instructions. To transfer data between the CPU and
peripheral devices, the following steps are used:
● Read from MMIO. To transfer data from peripheral
devices to the CPU, the data is first read via an ldc
instruction and placed in rI/O. The data is then read
from rI/O and placed in the internal register file via
an ld instruction.
● Write to MMIO. To transfer data from the CPU to the
peripheral devices, the data is first written to rI/O via
an st instruction. The data is then written from rI/O
to a MMIO address via a stc instruction.
Control Flow Instructions. Before a branch instruction
is executed, the two values that are compared are loaded by
the CPU into rb0 and rb1 via st instructions. Afterwards, the
branch instruction that implicitly accesses the registers rb0
and rb1 is executed.
For the employed MIPS ISA, we augment the CPU by
a further dedicated register for the call/return mechanism.
The MIPS return instruction jr ra jumps to the value in
the register ra which could be exploited to reveal dynamic
values in the general purpose register file. Hence, the
additional register is hardware-enforced to only operate
on jal/jr instructions that store and restore the program
counter upon execution of a call and return, respectively.
By use of hardware-level access control, the goal of
the adversary is to find an appropriate obfuscated ld/st
instruction to construct an attack. The key idea is that the
obfuscated st and ld (that write and read data to and from
the memory-mapped registers) can be hidden by software-
level obfuscation techniques described in Sect. 6.
5.4 Hardware-level Booby Traps
In addition to hardware-enforced access control, a hardware-
level tamper response mechanism is needed to prevent
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disclosure of the ISA encoding. This response mechanism is
added to our defense arsenal to protect against a variety of
the attacks, see Sect. 9.
A booby trap is an active defense that is directly
triggered by a detected attack. Such approaches have been
developed for software protection [40] and for protection
of high-security hardware devices. Hardware systems with
tamper detection and response include hardware firewalls in
smart cards [41] and the erasure of cryptographic material in
response to an attack [42].
Booby Trap Triggers. For our system, we employ the
following triggers to detect an attack:
● Invalid Memory Access. The access control unit
triggers a booby trap once an invalid memory access
by the ld / st or ldc / stc instructions is executed.
● Dedicated Opcodes. Several dedicated opcodes (par-
ticularly R-type instructions) are reserved to trigger a
booby trap on execution.
● Malformed Operands. The instruction format is
leveraged to detect malformed operands and sub-
sequently trigger a booby trap on execution. For
example, a non-shift R-type instruction that encodes
a non-zero shamt value triggers a booby trap.
Booby Trap Tamper Response. To prevent the disclosure
of the instruction encoding, the instruction decode unit can be
cleared in a non-volatile manner to prevent further operation.
For practical purposes, a counter could be employed to detect
multiple attack attempts prior to the burning of a fuse to
disable the unit.
6 SOFTWARE-LEVEL OBFUSCATION
A limitation of hardware-level obfuscation is the preservation
of the program structure. Despite an obfuscated instruction
encoding, the CFG and instruction sequencing provide
valuable information sources as demonstrated in Sect. 10.
Hence, we employ well-established software obfuscation
transformations to hide these information sources.
Control Flow Graph-Level Obfuscation. The control
flow of a call graph and associated basic block topology
provide viable information for a reverse-engineer. Looping
and conditional structures can be exploited to deduce infor-
mation regarding the high-level algorithm implementation.
To obscure these traces, code flattening and procedure merging
are employed [43]. Code flattening inserts a switch statement
and a dispatcher that controls the basic block execution
sequence. Procedure merging scrambles both function and
interprocedural level control by inlining functions within
each other.
Basic Block-Level Obfuscation. CFG-level obfuscation
effectively disrupts control flow assumptions and splits large
basic blocks, however small basic blocks remain unchanged.
To hide small basic blocks, we utilize basic block normalization.
The number of instructions per basic block are normalized
by filling space with garbage code that does not affect the
semantic behavior of the basic block. A range of basic block
sizes are used and basic block positioning is permuted in
memory to hinder static analysis.
Instruction-Level Obfuscation. CFG and basic block
level transformations do not remove all program char-
acteristics. Dedicated instruction sequences and memory
accesses are not affected by these obfuscation techniques.
To remove potential code structure assumptions such as the
stack clean-up after a function call, instruction substitution
is used which replaces specific instruction sequences by
other functional equivalent but more complicated instruction
sequences [43]. This technique is a vital component for our
statistical evaluation.
Instruction substitution is used to hide critical ld/st
instructions employed for hardware-level access control,
see Sect. 5.3. For example, an instruction substitution rule
can be easily defined for (virtually) any architecture which
replaces a ld instruction by a stack pointer displacement,
a pop, and a subsequent original stack pointer recovery.
The stack pointer displacement can be further constituted of
multiple instructions so that the basic block normalization
spreads this information among diverse basic blocks. Note
that the register value that is added to the immediate value
in the ld/st instructions can be arbitrarily changed while
the sum of both values (the target address) remains the
same. This effect greatly increases the number of distinct
representations.
7 IMPLEMENTATION
To demonstrate our hybrid obfuscation approach we have
developed a soft microprocessor generation framework to
automatically implement protected CPUs. This framework is
supported with a full compilation flow which performs our
structural transformations.
Hardware Implementation. Our prototype hardware im-
plementation employs the SPREE soft processor generation
framework [6]. Processors generated with the framework use
the MIPS instruction format. A Register Transfer Level (RTL)
description of specific processor instantiations are generated
from textual descriptions of the ISA and processor data
path. An RTL generator was written to include hardware
for a randomized ISA encoding and the insertion of the
hardware units described in Sect. 5. The number of opcode
homophones and operand permutations in the processor
hardware implementation are user-defined with respect to
the instruction format. Similarly, the number of booby trap
triggering opcodes and the memory layout are also user-
defined.
Software Implementation. Our prototype compiler im-
plementation leverages the LLVM/Clang compiler and the
Obfuscator-LLVM environment developed by Junod et al.
[43]. The latter framework provides transformations such as
the code flattening and instruction substitution. We extended
the Obfuscator-LLVM environment to implement basic block
normalization.
To allow for late code address determination, we modified
the GNU assembler to generate two non-linked .o object files.
Each object file is created with different encoded ISAs: ISA A
and ISA B. The object files are then linked to their libraries,
which were also encoded with ISAs A and B. Relocatable
instructions are then identified by examining instructions
that differ in the two files after obfuscation is removed. Once
all relocatable instructions have been processed, an object
file is linked and address dependent operand permutation
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is applied. The final executable file is fully linked and ISA
encoding is employed.
8 PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section we present area and run-time performance
results for the hardware and software obfuscation transfor-
mations.
Area Overhead. We evaluated the area overheads for
varying hardware-level obfuscation parameters in contrast
to dedicated CPU units based on the SPREE processor
generation framework. Hardware designs were synthesized
to an Altera Cyclone V A2 FPGA. All designs were tested
via simulation to determine their accurate behavior.
Design LUTs FFs Mem. Bits
SPREE + BT 915 204 2048
SPREE + BT + OS + OP(1) 933 204 2304
SPREE + BT + OS + OP(2) 936 204 2304
SPREE + BT + OS + OP(4) 976 204 2304
SPREE + BT + OS + OP(8) 1015 204 2304
SPREE 889 202 2048
Available Resources 18868 112960 1802000
Table 2: Hardware area overhead for the additional obfusca-
tion elements.
Tab. 2 lists the utilized hardware resources in terms of
Look-up tables (LUTs) and Flip Flops (FFs) required for the
different hardware units. The booby trap (BT) unit realizes
the logic to trigger a booby trap based on incorrect memory
accesses, malformed instructions, and for dedicated opcodes
as described in Sect. 5.4. We considered two dedicated opcode
triggers and one MMIO address. The opcode substitution
(OS) and the operand permutation (OP) implement the
hardware-level transformations described in Sect. 5.1 and
Sect. 5.2, respectively. The OS designs include a homophonic
substitution which employs each possible value for the
opcode and funct fields, the extended register file, and
support for ldc/stc instructions. OP(x) denotes that x
distinct operand permutations are implemented.
The hardware overhead of the BT circuitry is lightweight
in terms of additional LUTs and FFs and the overhead of the
OS consists only of several LUTs. Increasing the number of
operand permutations OP results in a hardware overhead
of up to 14% for LUTs compared to the original SPREE
processor. The 36 registers (= 32 general purpose registers
+ rI/O + rb0 + rb1 + 1 call/ret register) are implemented in
the memory blocks of the FPGA. Similarly, the internal 64 kB
RAM is implemented in the memory blocks of the FPGA.
The processor speed is not affected by the hardware-
level augmentations listed in Tab. 2. The additional elements
do not affect the critical path of the design in the execute
stage of the three-stage processor (ALU and regFile). Our
modifications are restricted to the instruction fetch and
memory stages.
Performance and Memory Overhead. We evaluated the
performance overhead for the different obfuscation trans-
formations on the SPREE embedded benchmark suite [6].
The obfuscation strategies were applied to the programs
and the clock cycle counts for 100 versions of each pro-
gram were measured. In the following discussion, the
employed obfuscation transformations are abbreviated as
follows: opcode substitution (OS), opcode permutation (OP),
instruction substitution (IS), code flattening (CF), and basic
block normalization (BBN). Procedure merging was not
considered for the evaluation as the targeted benchmark
programs generally consist of only one function.
Tab. 3 lists the performance results for the different ob-
fuscation strategies for the SPREE benchmark programs. The
average performance slowdown of IS ranges between approx.
1.1× and 2× for all programs except des. For des, the
influence of IS is significant as the cryptographic algorithm
employs numerous xor instructions that are swapped for
more complex representations. The CF transformation leads
to performance slowdown based on the underlying program
structure. Since the implementation of the des program is
loop-free, CF does not affect performance. For non-loop-free
programs, the slowdown depends on high-level program
structure. Measured slowdown ranges between approx. 2×
and 6×. For the combined OS+OP+CF+IS strategy the effect
of both transformations is additive. The CF transformation
adds a switch statement to the target program and uses a
variable to control execution order. This transformation is not
affected by the IS implementation. The combined obfuscation
approaches OS+OP+CF+IS+BBN affect performance loss
more significantly. Transformation CF splits up basic blocks
which are then padded by BBN. Hence, performance is
slowed down by a factor of approximately 4× to 39×
compared to the unobfuscated version.
Tab. 4 states program size for the different obfuscation
strategies. For the IS transformation, most targeted programs
are only increased by several hundred bytes. For reasons
similar to those given for performance evaluation, des is
strongly influenced by IS. The CF transformation affects
program size depending on the underlying program struc-
ture. Since the targeted programs in the suite contain a small
number of loops and branches, program size increases by
less than 1 kB compared to the OS+OP obfuscated programs.
The combined obfuscation strategy OS+OP+CF+IS+BBN
increases the binary size as each basic block is padded with
instructions. A binary size overhead of up to 3 kB is seen for
the targeted programs compared to the OS+OP obfuscated
programs. The des program size increases by 4× compared
to the OS+OP obfuscated program.
In summary, software protection naturally affects code
performance and binary size depending on the degree of
obfuscation. Our program slowdown and binary size results
are in line with several other related works in this field, see
Sect. 2. The performance and binary size effects of hardware
obfuscation are much more limited.
9 SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, a security analysis is provided for the diverse
adversary accessible attacks presented in Sect. 3.3.
Hardware-level Booby Traps. The booby trap mecha-
nism provides a crucial anchor to prevent the disclosure of
processor’s instruction encoding in response to an attack.
To the best of the authors’ knowledge, current SRAM-FPGA
families only support fuses which can be programmed via
external FPGA access. Relying on this type of fuse program-
ming risks disruption by the adversary. Alternatively, a booby
trap can be used in which the adversary triggers the device to
reload its entire configuration before the soft microprocessor
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bubbl. crc CRC32 des fact. fft fir iquant quant
OS+OP 8012 24611 568886 1097 139 3067 1085 3401 3697
OS+OP+IS 8308 45930 1085654 4428 143 3784 1286 4485 4425
OS+OP+CF 36687 41514 1165379 1097 454 18187 7519 11217 10020
OS+OP+CF+IS 38105 61237 1641889 4429 455 19659 7801 12710 11854
OS+OP+CF+IS+BBN 48293 191189 6609719 4439 1732 119486 22160 35451 42932
Unobfuscated 8012 24611 568886 1097 139 3067 1085 3401 3697
Table 3: Software performance evaluation for the obfuscation strategies. Each result indicates the number of cycles
arithmetically averaged over 100 programs.
bubbl. crc CRC32 des fact. fft fir iquant quant
OS+OP 1.42 1.40 1.56 5.92 1.35 2.04 1.94 1.93 1.98
OS+OP+IS 1.44 1.57 1.92 20.62 1.36 2.20 2.07 2.12 2.15
OS+OP+CF 1.87 1.73 2.03 5.92 1.86 2.95 2.68 2.62 2.71
OS+OP+CF+IS 1.89 1.90 2.34 20.50 1.86 3.15 2.83 2.96 3.03
OS+OP+CF+IS+BBN 2.39 2.77 3.33 20.69 2.33 4.83 3.73 4.11 4.33
Unobfuscated 1.42 1.40 1.56 5.92 1.35 2.04 1.94 1.93 1.98
Table 4: Software size evaluation for the obfuscation strategies. Each result indicates the program memory size in kB
arithmetically averaged over 100 programs.
is reactivated. This action requires a time-consuming process.
For example, the smallest Cyclone V device (A2) requires
21,061,028 configuration bits [44]. Configuration can be
performed 16 bits at a time at 125 MHz. Thus, configuration
requires at least 10.5 ms per booby trap trigger.
Control Flow Attack. jmp, call, and ret instructions
cannot be exploited to disclose instruction encoding informa-
tion as the instructions are not affected by hardware-level
obfuscation. We illustrate our resistance to the control flow
attack via an example. In a possible attack, the attacker
would write values from the register file to interface registers
rb0 and rb1 to compare the values using an unobfuscated
beq instruction. Therefore, the attacker must craft two store
instructions st r0,r0,imm0 and st r0,r0,imm1, where
imm0 and imm1 are the addresses of rb0 and rb1, respectively.
To accomplish the attack, the attacker must guess the opcode
(26 − k), where k is the number of known opcodes. In
addition, he must guess the operand permutation for the
16-bit immediate value ((2616) steps) and the two addresses
(216 ⋅ (216 − 1) steps). To algorithmically verify the guessed
instruction encoding, the attacker could attempt to transfer
values from all 32 registers and check for equality. Even
without consideration of the booby trap mechanism, the
worst-case attack complexity for k = 10 known opcodes
is approximately 265. Note that for the MIPS architecture
register r0 always holds a constant zero.
Input/Output Attack. Similar to the branch instruction
attack, the adversary could leverage writes to MMIO ad-
dresses to reveal the instruction encoding, although the
amount of time required to perform the attack is prohibitive.
He must craft a store instruction st r0,r0,imm, where
imm is the address of rI/O. Hence, the attacker must guess
the opcode (26 − k steps), the operand permutation for the
16-bit immediate value ((2616) steps), and the address value
(216 steps). Even without consideration of the booby trap
mechanism, the worst-case attack complexity for k = 10
known opcodes is approximately 249 (including the 31 checks
to determine if the written values are distinct).
Furthermore, the evaluation of all possible 32-bit instruc-
tions will trigger 520,093,696 ≈ 228.95 booby traps due to
the invalid shamt field (for 8 non-shift R-type instructions).
Hence, the reconfiguration time for an A2 FPGA is approx. 63
days as each reconfiguration requires at least 10.5 ms. Even
for a randomly chosen instruction value, the probability that
it triggers the shamt field booby trap is around 12%.
Correctness Attack. As a consequence of the homo-
phones in the opcode substitution, the adversary can leverage
the correctness attack to reveal parts of the instruction
encoding. The homophones are mainly implemented in the
funct field of R-type instructions. For simplicity, we assume
that the targeted program is deterministic so that the same
inputs compute the same output values and the adversary is
able to observe both.
The attacker would like to substitute homophones for
an instruction with just one representative value to reveal
parts of the instruction encoding. If the adversary alters
the funct field to a correct homophone opcode, the output
of a deterministic algorithm will not change. An incorrect
homophone yields an incorrect opcode or operand and hence
a different output. To complete the attack, the attacker must
guess the opcode (26 − k steps), the operand permutation
for the 6-bit immediate value ((266 ) steps), and the funct
value (26 steps). Even without consideration of the booby
trap mechanism, the worst-case attack complexity for k = 10
known opcodes is approximately 229 deterministic program
executions.
System Configuration / Instruction Timing Attack.
Since system configuration instructions are not affected by
the hardware-level obfuscation and all obfuscated instruc-
tions consume the same number of clock cycles, both attacks
cannot be exploited.
Cautionary Note. All the attack strategies noted above
require the use of attacker-controlled values to perform a
hypothesis test. If the targeted program deliberately contains
an st ra,rb,imm instruction in which imm is the address
of an interface register and rb is attacker controlled (r0 in
the case of MIPS), the attack complexities are significantly
reduced. The adversary only must guess the ra encoding in
the operand ((266 ) ≈ 2
17 steps) and analyze the register file
(25 − 1 steps). Hence, the system designer must analyze
whether such an st ra,rb,imm instruction exists and
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obfuscate the instruction accordingly.
In summary, hardware-level obfuscation increases the
adversary’s efforts. A booby trap is likely to be triggered via
an invalid memory access for a guessed st instruction or
a dedicated opcode for R-type instructions. To increase the
probability that the average-case attack also triggers a booby
trap, the system designer can adjust the parameters for the
booby trap triggers prior to processor generation.
10 SECURITY METRICS FOR OBFUSCATION
Obfuscation deters algorithm reverse-engineering and anal-
ysis of the algorithm’s internal architecture. A current
limitation of obfuscation is the lack of a metric to measure
the degree of obfuscation for different approaches. The
generic concept of indistinguishability provides a formal
treatment and offers provable arguments for obfuscation
from the theoretic point of view. However, cryptographic
program obfuscation schemes are still far away from being
deployable [45], especially for embedded systems with
constrained resources. A practical measure of obfuscation
degree for software-only obfuscation has been limited by the
attacker’s knowledge of the targeted ISA and, thus, an ability
to emulate and analyze the targeted program. This situation
changes for hardware-level obfuscation systems due to the
concealed ISA encoding. In the following, we propose a novel
evaluation methodology to provide an obfuscation metric
for hybrid obfuscated systems.
10.1 Similarity Metric
A key characteristic of obfuscation is to (virtually) destroy
any correlation between an obfuscated and an unobfuscated
program. For example, suppose there are two distinct pro-
grams P1, P2 and their obfuscated versions O(P1), O(P2).
If there exists a significant correlation of a characteristic
between P1 and O(P1), but no significant correlation for
this feature between P1 and O(P2), the obfuscated program
O(P1) can be matched to its unobfuscated counterpart. For
example, the similarity of the DCFG or the entropy of the
instruction opcodes could be used as such characteristics.
Thus, a goal of obfuscation is to make obfuscated programs
as similar as possible so that their measurable quantities do
not allow a distinction between them
Methodology. To examine the program similarity created
by obfuscation strategies and, thus, the degree of obfusca-
tion, we implement the following: First, a set of programs
P = {P1, . . . ,Pn} is selected. Obfuscated versions for each
program in P are then generated. For an obfuscation strategy
O, multiple versions per program are generated to increase
the coverage of the assessment. Then, a set of similarity
comparison algorithms A = {A1, . . . ,Am} are employed and
the similarities between the obfuscated and unobfuscated
programs are examined.
We assume that the adversary can implicitly obtain
the function call graph and, hence, some functions of the
program. For example, several program functions may be
provided by an adversary-accessible open-source or closed-
source library. Hence, the adversary is able to examine the
similarity of numerous functions in a targeted program
(instead of the whole program) to break the obfuscation. This
examination allows for testing of function-level similarity
that is more fine-grained than similarity analysis for a
larger program. Furthermore, this evaluation methodology
uses a concept which is similar to computational indis-
tinguishability. Nevertheless, without the use of strong
cryptographic primitives, the property of computationally
indistinguishability cannot be guaranteed. Our goal is not
indistinguishability from a uniform distribution, but rather
eliminating similarity between obfuscated programs and
their unobfuscated counterparts, which is sufficient for
practical purposes.
Advantages. Our proposed evaluation methodology
is particularly beneficial for hardware-level obfuscation
schemes as the adversary cannot emulate and thus reverse-
engineer the obfuscated program without the corresponding
ISA encoding. Furthermore, this assessment roadmap is
generic in the sense that new algorithms can be developed
and added to the set of similarity comparison algorithms. In
this way we can (automatically) examine obfuscation benefits
against a defined set of attacks and provide a measure of
the degree of obfuscation for a specific obfuscation strategy
applied to certain programs. Notably, we can identify pro-
grams for which the selected obfuscation strategy might not
be sufficient to bring the program set to a specific measurable
obfuscation level.
Limitations. Despite various advantages, we acknowl-
edge that the measurability approach does have certain
limitations. Similar to ORAM [8] and cryptographic obfusca-
tion [46], the I/O behaviour cannot be modeled. However,
embedded systems are generally equipped with less I/O
than general-purpose systems with a rich-featured operating
system. It can be said that we cannot conclude from the statis-
tics that a particular obfuscation strategy avoids successful
attack. However, the statistics do indicate that at least certain
global properties can be successfully obfuscated and certain
strategies generally lead to a poor obfuscation. A further
arguable issue is the selection of our target program set. In
our case, we exclude specially crafted programs that would
still have measurable similarity after the obfuscation since
we want to provide a measure for programs more typically
deployed by users.
Similarity measures of external data memory are outside
the scope of our metrics. Data randomization schemes [27]
could be utilized to dynamically encode/decode the internal,
trusted RAM before it is stored to/loaded from the external,
untrusted data memory.
10.2 Case Study – SPREE Benchmark Suite
We evaluated the programs of the SPREE benchmark suite [6]
with the evaluation methodology described in the previous
section. The statistical distributions of the instruction mem-
ory (Sect. 10.2.2) and the dynamic CFG (Sect. 10.2.3) for the
different obfuscation strategies were investigated. It should
be noted that almost all programs in this benchmark suite
consist of only one vital function making the program set an
ideal candidate suite for our evaluation methodology.
10.2.1 Statistical Background
To allow the reader to better interpret our results, we provide
a concise summary of our measures and the rationale behind
their use. Our evaluation measures are based on the number
of appearances of a certain 6-bit opcode o ∈ {0,1}6 in a
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program P denoted by NP(o). Similarly, opcode triples and
the number of their appearances are denoted by o3 ∈ {0,1}6×
{0,1}6 × {0,1}6 and N 3P(o3), respectively. Moreover, FP(o)
is the empirical distribution for the opcode o of a program P,
i.e.
FP(o) = NP(o)
∑
i
NP(i)
, i ∈ {0,1}6
For completeness, we performed instruction operand analy-
sis for our statistical measures. However, the 26-bit operand
distributions did not provide meaningful results. Subse-
quently, we evaluated hashes of the operands using the
measures. However, the results for the least significant 6-/7-
/8-bit of the operand hashes were similar to the opcode
results, hence we omit these results from the following
discussion.
Entropy. The Shannon entropy is a measure of the
information content of a random variable. In our case, we
are interested in the entropy of the opcode and operand
distributions as we expect that a larger entropy hints at
better obfuscation (due to less pronounced peaks).
Definition 1 (Shannon Entropy). The Shannon entropy of a
program is determined by:
E(P) = −∑
o
FP(o) ⋅ log2(FP(o))
Standard Deviation. The standard deviation is a measure
of the inhomogeneity of a random variable. In our case,
we evaluate the standard deviation for the frequency of
opcode triples rather than a single opcode value as triplet
distributions are also employed for the frequency analysis
of simple cryptographic ciphers. The larger the difference in
frequency of certain triples, the larger the standard deviation
can be. This metric indicates which unobfuscated programs
relate to an obfuscated one.
Definition 2 (Adapted Standard Deviation). The adapted
standard deviation sd3(P) is determined by
sd3(P) =
√
1
n+−1 ∑
o3
(N 3P(o3) − ν(P))2
for N 3P(o3) > 0, n+ ∶= ∣{o3}∣, ν(P) ∶= 1n+ ∑
o3
N 3P(o3)
We additionally performed analysis for the adapted
standard deviations sd2 and sd4 based on pairs and 4-tuples
of consecutive opcodes. However, these results were similar
to the results of sd3, hence we omit these results from the
following discussion.
E-sd3 Information. The combined information of en-
tropy E and sd3 was also considered. For two distinct
program P1 and P2, the marginal distributions of the E
and sd3 may strongly overlap so that the programs cannot
be told apart. However, E and sd3 may be strongly positively
correlated for P1, but anticorrelated for P2. As a result, the
programs form distinct clusters of points in an E-sd3 diagram
and hence offer a distinction between the programs P1 and
P2.
Correlation. The correlation of the distributions between
the unobfuscated and obfuscated programs was also con-
sidered as a statistical measure. The Spearman correlation
was employed as this correlation measures the amount
by which two variables are connected by a monotonous
trend. This measure contrasts with the more restrictive
assumption of linearity in case of the Pearson correlation.
The Spearman correlation also achieves increased robustness
against possible outliers which heavily impact the Pearson
correlation, i.e., opcodes having a (close to) zero frequency.
The Spearman correlation uses the ranks of the observations
as opposed to the observations themselves (Pearson’s cor-
relation). In our case, we examined the correlation between
the ranked opcode frequency distribution for obfuscated and
unobfuscated programs.
Definition 3 (Spearman Correlation). The Spearman correla-
tion for two program Px and Py is determined by
ρ(NPx ,NPy) = 2
−6 ⋅ ∑
o∈{0,1}6
( rk()NPx(o))−µ̂PxSPx ) ⋅ (
rk(NPy (o))−µ̂Py
SPy
)
for the mean µ̂P ∶= 2−6 ⋅∑o∈{0,1}6 rk(NP(o)) and the stan-
dard deviation SP ∶=
√
2−6 ⋅∑o∈{0,1}6(rk(NP(o)) − µ̂P)2,
where the pairs (rk(NPx(o)), rk(NPy(o))) are the ranks
of the observed numbers of appearances NPy(o) which
are determined separately for each program.
10.2.2 Statistical Analysis of the Instruction Memory
Using the above statistical measures, evaluation results for
the instruction memory were generated. Hybrid obfuscation
was applied to each program. A total of 100 different ISA
encodings per obfuscation technique were applied. The
obfuscation transformations in the following discussion are
abbreviated as in Sect. 8.
Entropy. Fig. 3 depicts the entropy of the instruction
opcodes distribution for the increasingly sophisticated obfus-
cation strategies (a) - (d). The blue points below 3.0 depict
the entropy of the unobfuscated programs in each figure (a)
- (d). The boxes depict a sketch of the entropy distribution
of the obfuscated programs, where the thick horizontal line
within the box is the median and the box extends from the
lower 25% to the upper 75% quantile, i.e., ≈ 25% of the
programs have entropies below the lower edge and ≈ 25%
have entropies above the upper edge of the box. The whiskers
extend to the smallest and largest entropy and the circles
outside of the region covered by the whiskers cover even
more extreme entropies (only contained in some figures).
OS+OP performs the poorest with many outliers, small
boxes, and a range of medians covering a range of ap-
proximately 4.1 − 5.0 in entropy. For OS+OP+IS and
OS+OP+CF+IS, there are sharp distributions without signif-
icant outliers (visible as the isolated points below and above
the boxes). OS+OP+CF+IS+BBN combines the best of both
groups: the boxes are nearly as large as OS+OP+CF+IS and
there is approximately the same homogeneity of box posi-
tions (approximately 50% less variable for a large fraction of
programs). This obfuscation strategy generates a significant
number of outliers which complicates the determination of
which program is under inspection.
The entropy provides an effective measure to quantify
the extent of program information loss due to obfuscation.
Here, we use the degree of homogeneity of the box locations
as well as the percentage of entropy values which are far
away from the typical values, i.e., the outliers.
Standard Deviation. Fig. 4 shows the boxplots of the
standard deviation sd3 of the instruction opcode distribution
for the increasingly sophisticated obfuscation strategies (a) -
(d). Note that a favourable obfuscation strategy should result
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in boxes which overlap for different programs and not allow
for programs to be uniquely distinguished.
This goal is best achieved by the OS+OP+CF+IS+BBN
obfuscation which produces the largest boxes and the great-
est overlap in comparison to the other obfuscation methods.
In contrast to the entropy metric, sd3 considers the variability
in the distribution of opcode triples. A large variability in
sd3 for different obfuscations of the same program illustrates
a large variability in the homogeneity of the frequencies in
which certain opcodes appear in consecutive order rather
than the homogeneity of the frequencies in which certain
opcodes appear overall in the code. Hence, sd3 provides
important supplementary information to entropy to quantify
the extent of the information loss due to obfuscation and also
to specify the variability of different obfuscations of the same
program.
E-sd3 Information. Fig. 5 combines the entropy informa-
tion and the sd3 values for the opcodes by displaying a point
in an entropy-sd3 coordinate system for each program. A
small dot is shown for each obfuscated program and a star is
shown for an unobfuscated program. The colors for the dots
indicate the program from which the obfuscated program
was generated.
We see that the point clouds and the overlap between
clouds for different programs are much larger for the
OS+OP+CF+IS+BBN obfuscation technique than for all
others. While this effect is also discernible in the boxplots
of the marginal distributions of the entropies and the sd3,
the E-sd3 diagram demonstrates that these quantities are
not correlated or anticorrelated in a way which would
allow the determination of a program under consideration.
Such a correlation would show that a large entropy value
coincides with a large sd3. This correlation would result in
disjoint clusters of points (alignment parallel to the main
diagonal in the diagram). Thus, the E-sd3 diagram provides
essential information of the combined measures to depict the
information loss due to obfuscation.
Correlation. Fig. 6 depicts the results of the correlations
for the opcodes of the fft program, a typical case. Each
panel shows the correlations between the opcode frequencies
for a specific obfuscation. The boxes illustrate the distribution
of the correlations between the obfuscated programs and
the unobfuscated fft and the stars show the correlations
between the unobfuscated programs and the unobfuscated
program fft.
The correlations between the obfuscated programs and
the true underlying program fft are not significantly differ-
ent across all obfuscation approaches. Hence, the correlations
do not identify the true underlying program since the
hardware-level obfuscation is sufficient to hamper program
distinction.
10.2.3 Dynamic Control Flow Graph Similarity
Since the adversary has access to the DCFG, the similarity
between obfuscated and unobfuscated DCFGs was evaluated
for the SPREE benchmark suite. For each obfuscation strategy,
we generated 100 programs per benchmark and extracted
each DCFG. As described in Sect. 2, several algorithms have
been proposed to measure the CFG similarity. In a recent
evaluation, Chan et al. [23] demonstrated that the graph edit
distance algorithm proposed by Hu et al. [25] is most efficient
in terms of accuracy and run time. This approach was used
to determine the similarity score of our recorded DCFGs.
Fig. 7 shows the results of our DCFG similarity
evaluation. Obfuscated programs are compared to their
unobfuscated versions in (a) and (b). A similarity score close
to 1 implies that the graphs are similar, whereas a score
close to 0 implies the opposite. The figure shows that a
targeted program can be uniquely distinguished among
the set of obfuscated programs if the DCFG is not affected
by the obfuscation (Fig. 7 (a)). DCFG similarity between
obfuscated and unobfuscated programs decreases as more
obfuscation techniques are combined, hampering unique
identification (Fig. 7 (b)). For example, the factorial
program in Fig. 7 (b) cannot be distinguished from the set of
programs.
Based on the statistical and DCFG evaluation results,
it is apparent that the information characteristic for the
des cryptographic algorithm stands out compared to other
general-purpose embedded programs. Overall, we see that
just using hardware-level obfuscation is not sufficient to
hide crucial program characteristics. It must be combined
with software-level transformation in order prevent unique
distinction by the various measures.
11 DISCUSSION
In the following we analyze the diverse properties of our
hybrid obfuscation scheme and discuss its security.
In general, hardware I/O mechanisms and instruction
encoding format have crucial impacts on the security of
hardware-level obfuscation. Our proposed lightweight pro-
cessor augmentations mitigate generic adversary accessible
attacks to hide the vital ISA encoding from a physical
adversary. Furthermore, we are able to detect and respond to
tampering attempts by the use of a booby trap mechanism.
We have demonstrated how ISA encoding diversification
can be implemented so that processors augmented with
hardware-level features can be automatically generated. As a
consequence of the randomized ISA encoding, the adversary
is not able to directly disassemble and reverse-engineer a
targeted program. Nevertheless, the ISA encoding itself is
not sufficient in our adversary model as crucial program
characteristics and hence we employ diverse software-level
obfuscation transformations ranging from the CFG-level to
the instruction-level.
Note that this approach does not affect testability during
development as the obfuscation can be selectively turned
off, so that general-purpose user code can be debugged.
Since we employ an integrated and automated compilation
flow for the hardware-level and software-level obfuscation,
a developer has full access to all compiler log files as well as
the hardware-level instruction encoding mapping.
Perhaps most importantly, the benefits of hybrid obfus-
cation transformations have been evaluated with statistical
evaluation metrics. It has been demonstrated that it is not
possible to match an obfuscated program to one of a group
of unobfuscated ones by considering a selection of statistical
metrics (Sect. 10.1). The hardware overhead of our approach
is about 14% of processor logic area.
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(a) OS+OP. (b) OS+OP+IS. (c) OS+OP+CF+IS. (d) OS+OP+CF+IS+BBN.
Figure 3: Entropy of the opcode distributions for the different obfuscation strategies.
(a) OS+OP. (b) OS+OP+IS. (c) OS+OP+CF+IS. (d) OS+OP+CF+IS+BBN.
Figure 4: sd3-distributions for the different obfuscation strategies.
(a) OS+OP. (b) OS+OP+IS. (c) OS+OP+CF+IS.
• bubbl.
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(d) OS+OP+CF+IS+BBN.
Figure 5: E-sd3-diagrams for the different obfuscation strategies. The colour legend for all figures is specified in (d).
(a) OS+OP. (b) OS+OP+IS. (c) OS+OP+CF+IS. (d) OS+OP+CF+IS+BBN.
Figure 6: Correlations of the opcodes for fft program for the different obfuscation strategies.
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(a) DCFG similarity for the OS+OP obfuscation strategy
compared to the unobfuscated programs.
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(b) DCFG similarity for the OS+OP+CF+IS+BBN obfusca-
tion strategy compared to the unobfuscated programs.
Figure 7: Dynamic control flow graph similarity evaluation for the benchmark programs and different obfuscation strategies.
12 FUTURE WORK
Hardware Issues. The underlying concept of an obfuscated
ISA encoding could potentially be applied to Application
Specific Integrated Circuits (ASICs) that provide several
field-programmable hardware elements, e.g., the WISC
concept [47]. For example, such a device could include a user-
defined ISA encoding, memory layout, and access control.
In particular, an ASIC could be generated by using just
one mask to reduce the manufacturing costs. Thus, a fleet
of embedded systems could be diversified to counteract the
“break one break all” principle. A further interesting direction
is dynamic instruction encoding update. This approach
would be particularly attractive as a moving target defense.
The disabling of an FPGA-based soft processor in response
to an attack is challenging since current SRAM-FPGAs do
not offer the ability to permanently set one or more non-
volatile fuses at run-time. The addition of this feature would
help in preventing deobfuscation attacks.
The security analysis of our approaches for processors
with dedicated cache memories is left for future research.
Software Issues. The performance overhead of software-
level obfuscation is significant for embedded systems. How-
ever, our evaluation results are in line with reported results
from other work published in this area, e.g. [43]. The
analysis of further obfuscation transformations such as
anti-emulation, code tamper proofing, and self-modifying
code [16], [43] in combination with Application Specific
Instruction-Set Processor techniques to decrease software
performance overhead are left for future research.
Security Metric Issues. Our security metrics could be
expanded to include new statistical tests that evaluate hybrid
obfuscation systems. A new metric which considers the
limited I/O of embedded systems would be particularly
advantageous.
13 CONCLUSION
ISA randomization provides a viable approach for obfus-
cation and exploit mitigation for embedded processors.
However, for embedded systems, various disclosure sources
can be leveraged to reveal crucial ISA information. Once
the ISA is revealed, the targeted software can be reverse-
engineered. This issue is particularly worrisome for low-cost
IoT systems with limited cryptographic protection.
In this work, we have presented a hybrid obfuscation
scheme consisting of hardware-level and software-level
obfuscation transformations to prevent a variety of disclosure
attacks. We combined the obfuscation transformations with
dedicated hardware booby traps to detect and respond to
manipulation attempts. Finally, we demonstrated a novel
evaluation methodology to assess the twofold diversification.
This methodology provides a quantitative method to qualify
the benefits of our approaches. The lack of quantitative
metrics has been a long-standing issue in the software
obfuscation domain. A performance evaluation of our proto-
type implementation demonstrates a lightweight hardware
overhead of up to 14% for a simple, low-cost embedded
processor.
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